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EASA and EUROCONTROL Answer GNSS Jamming With 22-Action Plan

EASA and EUROCONTROL published a 22-action GNSS interference plan on 26 March 2026, conceding pilot-awareness measures fall short as jamming becomes routine.

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  1. EASA and EUROCONTROL published a joint 22-action GNSS interference Action Plan on 26 March 2026.
  2. Ministers from 13 EU Member States wrote to the European Commission on 6 June 2025 demanding coordinated action.
  3. IATA's Flight Data eXchange has processed data from over 300 operators covering roughly 18.4 million flights.
  4. Most action deadlines fall between 2026 and 2028 across four workstreams including aircraft design.
  5. Documented effects include corrupted TAWS outputs and degraded ACAS functions.
Spoofed and Jammed: How GNSS Interference Is Rewriting ATC Procedure
PlateSpoofed and Jammed: How GNSS Interference Is Rewriting ATC Procedure — InsightPhotography / pixabay

EASA and EUROCONTROL published a joint Action Plan against GNSS interference on 26 March 2026, containing 22 actions across four workstreams with most deadlines falling between 2026 and 2028. The date matters less than the admission that accompanies it. Interference near conflict zones has, in the regulators' own words, become a routine occurrence rather than an exceptional one.

What does the plan concede?

EASA Executive Director Florian Guillermet was unusually blunt about the gap between current practice and the problem's scale. He said: "While the potential threat to aviation safety from GNSS interference has so far been mitigated by short-term actions such as raising pilot awareness, it is clear that more needs to be done." EUROCONTROL Director-General Raúl Medina called interference "a significant and evolving challenge for European aviation, making today's Action Plan an important step forward in our collective response."

The political pressure behind the plan is traceable. Ministers from 13 EU Member States submitted a joint letter to the European Commission on 6 June 2025, requesting coordinated action. Thirteen states signing one letter is itself a verdict: none of them believed it could address the problem alone.

What can corrupted signals actually do?

The operational consequences documented by EASA and EUROCONTROL extend well beyond a flickering map display. They include:

  • Incoherent navigation positions
  • Re-routing and diversions
  • Corrupted Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) outputs
  • Degraded Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) functions

IFALPA has added a sharper warning: corrupted GNSS inputs can propagate through connected aircraft systems in ways not fully transparent to crews. A pilot may be unaware that degraded data is already driving terrain alerts or traffic-avoidance functions. That is the core vulnerability. Aircraft systems place unconditional trust in signals they cannot independently verify.

What does the plan require?

The measures span short, mid and longer-term horizons, including harmonised operational procedures and phraseologies for controllers and crews. The phraseology point is less bureaucratic than it sounds. A controller and a crew using different terminology to describe a spoofing event risk talking past each other precisely when precision matters most.

The four workstreams, as reported by EuroWaypoint, cover human performance, organisational management, aircraft design and infrastructure. The inclusion of aircraft design is the significant one. It concedes that procedural mitigations reach a limit when hardware was never designed for sustained GNSS denial. Over the longer term, EASA and EUROCONTROL envisage collaboration with manufacturers and the avionics industry to build interference-resilient systems.

What do the pilots want?

IFALPA's 2026 Conference, convened in Istanbul, issued a formal statement on escalating interference events worldwide. The federation called for coordinated action from states, ICAO, operators, manufacturers and air navigation service providers — a list long enough to signal that no single party is expected to act alone.

On infrastructure, IFALPA argued that conventional ground-based navigation aids, specifically VOR, DME and ILS, must be preserved until robust alternative resilience measures exist globally. That position sits uncomfortably with decades of rationalisation during which many states retired navaids on the assumption that GNSS coverage was sufficient. IFALPA implies that judgement now needs revisiting.

The data backbone for such decisions may already exist. IATA's Flight Data eXchange programme, as EuroWaypoint reports, has processed data from over 300 operators covering approximately 18.4 million flights. To put that in perspective, 18.4 million flights is roughly two years of pre-pandemic global commercial traffic — a sample large enough for systematic, fleet-wide analysis of interference events. The regulatory frameworks to mandate such reporting, however, are still taking shape.

Is this a solution?

Not yet. The plan is a structure for work that has not been completed. Short-term measures — chiefly awareness and procedure — are in motion. The harder questions, avionics design and the future of ground-based infrastructure, carry longer deadlines and depend on parties with divergent interests.

For pilots, conventional navaid proficiency remains an operational skill rather than a historical one. For controllers, harmonised phraseology means updated training. For manufacturers, the design workstream is a formal regulatory invitation to treat GNSS resilience as a certification consideration.

Whether the 22 actions deliver a more resilient system by 2028 depends on execution by states, manufacturers, operators and service providers. The framework identifies who is responsible. Delivery is the next question, and Guillermet's own words concede the short-term mitigations have been only partially adequate.

via theaviationhub.co.uk (Source)

Filed under

  • gnss-interference
  • easa
  • eurocontrol
  • gnss-spoofing
  • aviation-safety
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