A Boeing 767-300 freighter touched down 3,750ft past the threshold of runway 30 at Miami before overrunning on 6 September, with the National Transportation Safety Board finding that the local controller did not transmit wind information to the crew before issuing the landing clearance.

The omission appears to conflict with US Federal Aviation Administration rules requiring wind direction and velocity to be passed when a tailwind component is present. The NTSB has yet to specify whether the gusting crosswind and tailwind contributed to the fatal accident sequence.

What did the wind show?

Meteorological data around the time of the overrun indicates wind from 190° at 17kt, gusting to 26kt. For runway 30, the values translate to:

• A crosswind component of 16-24kt
• A tailwind component of approximately 6-9kt

The tailwind figure sits just below the FAA's typical 10kt dry-runway limit and would normally trigger a wind call from the local controller.

Why is this a regulatory issue?

US FAA regulations require wind direction and velocity to be provided when a tailwind component is present on the cleared runway. The NTSB states the local controller "did not issue information about the wind" when clearing the 767 to land.

Four minutes earlier, gust information from 190° had been transmitted to a different aircraft. That crew was monitoring a different radio frequency, so the wind call never reached the 767 flight deck.

How high was the approach?

Flight-data recorder information shows the aircraft was high and fast on its approach. Approximately 25s before touchdown, at 500ft above the ground, the jet was still descending at 2,000ft/min. The crew received two "sink rate" alerts at this point — the standard EGPWS mode 1 warning triggered when descent rate exceeds safe thresholds at low altitude.

The descent rate slowed to 1,000ft/min roughly 10s before touchdown, near the point at which the aircraft crossed the runway threshold at about 100ft altitude.

What happened with the flaps?

At threshold crossing, the captain called for flaps to be extended from 20° to 30°. The call came so late that the flaps had not reached full 30° deployment when the main landing gear first contacted the runway.

The 20° to 30° transition on the 767 typically reduces approach speed and landing distance. A late configuration call at threshold height leaves no margin for full deployment before wheels-down, raising landing distance and reducing the energy available for a go-around.

Where did the jet touch down?

Investigators state the aircraft was 3,750ft past the runway threshold at touchdown. The crew attempted an abortive go-around before the 767 overran. The preliminary material does not identify the cargo operator.

What remains under investigation?

The NTSB has not reached conclusions regarding any possible contribution of the tailwind to the accident sequence. Investigators will examine:

• The controller's omission of wind data
• The crew's late flap configuration call
• The high descent rate on short final
• The aborted go-around decision

The probe is also likely to address how the crew responded to two successive sink-rate alerts, and whether stabilised-approach gates — typically policed at 1,000ft above ground level under US cargo operator policies — were breached.

The preliminary findings will inform a probable-cause determination that could shape ATC training priorities, cargo operator stabilised-approach enforcement, and crew response to wind and energy cues in the final approach segment. Subsequent NTSB updates are expected to release further factual material from the cockpit voice recorder and ATC transcripts.